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During the first week of December, the U.S. President hosted the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace agreement. He promised an end to years of warfare in the unstable eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Shortly after, however, a completely opposite approach to conflict emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, hitting sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President declared, I had cautioned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Strategic Pivot

These divergent actions encapsulates the central principle of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this term: a de-emphasis from promoting democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on commerce and ending wars—though how this squares with the emerging military strikes in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a top U.S. diplomat during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House representative echoed this, saying the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Inconsistencies

This pivot is consequential, but experts warn it is early to assess its effects. The approach is complicated by the President’s personal style, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and derogatory comments about Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained a senior fellow for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis forecasts this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a large number in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has adversely affected African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Diplomatic Neglect and Friction

Unlike his recent predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable engagement with African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later acknowledged using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major dispute has broken out with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Diplomacy and Targeted Action

A comparable standoff emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the forceful rhetoric may have prompted the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to end the fighting in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

Similar to Competitors

Experts see the new U.S. approach as similar to that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on commercial interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

Ultimately, the current policy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” she added.